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Hans Radder, Vincent Colapietro and Joseph Pitt have all raised interesting 
comments and concerns regarding the volume on pragmatist ethics. In our reply we will 
unfortunately not be able to address all of them equally extensive, but we will single out 
what we perceive to be the running threads through the comments.  
The Double Movement of Pragmatism's Universalism  
Hans Radder raises the issue of the status of universal norms, which allows us to 
give some more consideration to this issue. The pragmatist move against universalism is 
directed towards the widespread illness in philosophy to determine a priori, without factual 
inquiry, that some norms or criteria are universally valid. Pragmatism has two objections 
to this. The first concerns the fact that very often more important things are to be done in 
deliberating pressing ethical issues than to spell out and justify a priori valid norms 
through transcendental deductions or other non-empirical thought exercises. For example, 
paying serious attention to dilemmas at hand in order to discover promising approaches or 
possible answers to urgent ethical problems is often more fruitful than doing this a priori 
justification work. The second objection is that these non-empirical and non-experimental 
justification procedures are seen to be highly subjective and not very reliable.  
From Plato onwards philosophers have been craving towards the universal by 
postulating some eternal truths and deriving from them some local rules that are to be 
upheld by commoners. Pragmatism is not against all forms of universalism; the 
universalism pragmatism is against is the universalism-from-above, that excludes serious 
discussion. It is also opposed to the kind of universal claims to validity that are not put 
forward as invitations to either agree and to live accordingly, or to come up with serious 
counter arguments (here Radders distinctions are very helpful). This leaves room for 
universal claims a posteriori, universalism-from-below, from human practices. It is 
therefore not inconsistent to argue that pragmatists are against a certain type of 
universalism and at the same time to uphold certain norms or criteria of which it is 
claimed that they are underwritten by the practices involved or, different thing, should be 
underwritten. The first claim is then a deliberately empirical claim, based on investigation 
of all opinions on the issues covered by the norms. The second claim is a deliberately 
normative claim that invites all addressees to agree. The universalism-from-below does 
not imply the expectation that finally, somewhere, all practices will converge; it does not 
contain a utopian dream of a transcendental ideal of universal consensus, but the 
understanding that many practices do have similar norms and uphold similar values with 
respect to certain topics. Rawls' (1993) idea of an overlapping consensus across 
communalities belongs to this empirical universalism.  
The universalism-from-below takes the shape of a double movement. The first 
movement starts with local practices and local principles and their locality transcending 
power. Ethical orientations are contextual, but not context-bound, and can have a 
generalizable meaning (Kettner 1998). In how far those locality-transcending 
transpositions (be it norms, technologies, or institutions) will acquire consensus or not is 
an interesting issue and depends inter alia on the fruitfulness of these local norms. The 
second movement starts with the emergent aspects of what could be called a common, 
although fragmented, moral orientation. If one takes into account that practices nowadays 
are becoming more and more interdependent, it happens that these practices do indeed 
share a common morality vis-à-vis certain hot ethical topics. This common morality is 
incorporated in international institutions like those of the UN and in international treaties. 
This common morality is gaining influence with respect to practices, cultures and 
countries that are still deliberating. For example, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture spells out conditions of ethically sound technological 
use of resources on the basis of the norm of intergenerational sustainability. This treaty has 
been signed by many nations and the remaining nations are under pressure to take a stance 
toward this treaty. Long debates and deliberations took place before this treaty was 
formulated, and in this process of discovery of a potentially universal norm, a priori 
dictates were out of place. Reservations against universalism-from-above should not make 
one blind for the many factual agreements there are already at hand with respect to human 
rights, environmental protection, technology and natural resources.  
The Right and The Good  
Let us unpack the implications of these translocations from a local level to a 
general level and vice versa, by referring to Habermas' distinction between a moral and an 
ethical discourse (Habermas 1991). In his comments, Colapietro seems to suggest that it is 
not fruitful to distinguish between the moral question of "what is equally good for all" and 
the ethical question of "what is good for us" as members of a specific community.  
The distinction between moral issues for all and ethical issues for a specific 
community appears to be clear and applicable enough, but the contrary is the case. This is 
probably what motivated Colapietro's critique. We would like to add that the distinction is 
too crude because a whole range of social collectivities exists between a particular group 
and the global moral community. However, instead of discarding this distinction 
altogether, we want to stress the importance of the context in which it is applied. In some 
cases it can be helpful, in others not; in some cases what is good for all is clear (such as 'do 
not kill', or 'do not lie'), in other usually more interesting and more urgent cases it is not. 
Take for example a question like: should we invest in genomics to improve crops or 
should we invest in traditional technologies? Or: should we use this and not that pre-
implantation technology? It is a priori absolutely not clear which considerations are moral 
and which ones ethical, that is to say: which ones deserve general agreement (and to what 
extent), and which do not. Pragmatists like Dewey consider identifying and solving ethical 
dilemmas in connection with technology as a process of invention and reconstruction, and 
this applies also to the distinction between the moral and the ethical.  
As a consequence, the double movement of transcending local communities by 
generalizing their ethical strategies to a meso or even global level (or vice versa) leaves it 
to be seen which solution in the end turns out to be something that deserves generalized or 
less generalized agreement. For example, several natural and social technologies are 
involved in managing scarce natural resources, but there are various management 
strategies with different ethical connotations. The strategy of self-management by 
stakeholders of nearly extinct natural resources like salmon in Scotland might not be 
transferable to the pacific where the same kind of fish are being threatened. Here, global 
agreement on the strategy is not necessary, only the recognition that different species of 
salmon are a valuable natural common heritage that deserves to be preserved for the next 
generations (as stated in the earlier mentioned FAO-treaty). Another example, food safety 
arrangements can have different ethical connotations, depending on the various contextual 
definitions of food safety. Here again, the management of food technologies cannot nor 
should always be generalized (Korthals 2004). In sum, it is an open question what the 
scope of a normative claim should be and what evidence can be brought forward in these 
different cases.  
Consensus, compromise and coexistence  
Calapietro also criticizes our ideal of 'equal coexistence' as distressingly 
unpragmatic. This conclusion seems to rest (at least partly) on the fact that his conception 
of 'consensus' differs significantly from ours. Colapietro apparently sees consensus and 
compromise as much the same thing. He claims that it cannot be ruled out a priori that 
consensus or compromise among diverse communities can be achieved in practice. "The 
limits of compromise and consensus are, for pragmatism, experimentally determinable" he 
says. We do agree with this experimental approach when it comes to determining where 
the empirical limits and possibilities for consensus and compromise lie.  
However, we do want to hold on to an analytic distinction between consensus and 
compromise. Following Habermas, we understand rational consensus to be agreement on 
reasons for action, whereas a fair compromise is the agreement on a specific action 
without agreement on the reasons for action. Moreover, a compromise means that 
everyone involved makes concessions with regard to their interests. In other words, the 
difference between consensus and compromise is that between arguing and bargaining. 
From this definition it follows that the notions of a rationally motivated consensus and of 
an ethical pluralism between communities are mutually exclusive.  
Second, given our pluralist condition, the core question of pragmatism, how to live 
and work together, is therefore an urgent one for which consensus is not always a feasible 
answer. Compromises, on the other hand, are not always suitable because on deep-seated 
value conflicts people find it hard to bargain and to make concessions without 
compromising themselves or their integrity. Where consensus or compromise are 
unattainable we have suggested that we should aspire to an "equal coexistence" of 
different ethical convictions.  
We like to take this opportunity to elaborate a bit more on this ideal and on the 
ways to realise it. We want to do so by invoking the notion of 'boundary work', which has 
been developed in Science and Technology Studies (STS), and by connecting this notion 
with those of "frame restructuring" and "frame reflection" as developed within Public 
Policy Studies (PPS).  
Boundary work  
The tension between the heterogeneity of various actors and their viewpoints on the 
one hand and the necessity of cooperation and collective problem solving on the other can 
often be resolved through "boundary work." The term "boundary work" was launched in 
1981 by Steven Woolgar, and further developed by Thomas Gieryn in the context of the 
discussion on the demarcation of science and non-science. Gieryn studied how actors 
carve out a domain of cognitive authority for their discipline. He stressed the negotiated 
nature of what is considered science and what not. According to Gieryn the boundaries of 
science are fluid rather than fixed. His focus is on processes of differentiation, 
demarcation and distancing science from pseudoscience, ideology, or beliefs.  
Susan Leigh Star has shifted the focus from competition over cognitive claims and 
cultural capital to cooperation across the lines that separate communities. The two 
approaches are complementary. Together, they illuminate what separates or integrates 
various groups with different moral convictions and worldviews, and what complicates or 
facilitates communication and cooperation between them.  
On the basis of a case study of the historical development of the Museum of 
Vertebrate Zoology at the University of California, Star shows how heterogeneity and 
cooperation can coexist in the field of science. Scientific work is heterogeneous, requiring 
many different actors and viewpoints, but at the same time it also requires cooperation—
"to create common understandings, to ensure reliability across domains and to gather 
information which retains its integrity across time, space and local contingencies" (Star & 
Griesemer 1989, p. 387).  
In line with our pragmatist view, Star asserts that the tension between the 
heterogeneous nature of scientific work and its requirement for cooperation cannot be 
managed via a simple pluralism or a laissez-faire solution. Star introduces the notion of 
"boundary objects" to explain how people in practice handle both diversity and 
cooperation. Boundary objects are those objects that both inhabit several intersecting 
social worlds and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them.  
Boundary objects are objects that are both plastic enough to adapt to 
local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, 
yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They 
are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly 
structured in individual-site use. These objects may be abstract or 
concrete. They have different meanings in different social worlds but 
their structure is common enough to more than one world to make 
them recognizable, a means of translation. The creation and 
management of boundary objects is a key process in developing and 
maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds (p. 393).  
One of the most important features of the boundary object is that one group does 
not create or set the meaning of the object for other groups nor does one group regulate 
access to the object by other groups. "Boundary objects act as anchors or bridges, however 
temporary" (p. 414). They allow for equal coexistence without the necessity for consensus 
or compromise.  
Metaphors as Boundary Objects  
It is clear that boundary objects are quite divers. They not only include objects in 
the strict sense but also concepts, not only products but also processes and even people. 
An important type of boundary object is metaphor. Metaphors are mechanisms for 
understanding something in terms of something else. The conceptual function of 
metaphors is generally to understand complex, abstract or unstructured domains with the 
help of concepts from more familiar, concrete and well-known domains. But metaphors 
are not only important cognitive tools in making sense of the world but also in 
communicating about the world with others. This fits well with the comments of Joseph 
Pitt, who states that in seeking creative solutions to ethical problems posed by 
technological innovation, we have to start with the way we talk about our technologies. He 
claims that we need to come to a common language and the way to proceed is through 
metaphor. We agree with Pitt on the importance of metaphor and would like to point out 
that metaphors act like boundary objects. They are ambiguous and also flexible enough to 
allow for several uses and interpretations, both over time and across various topics, yet at 
the same time they are robust enough to maintain a basic set of conventional associations. 
Metaphors offer resonance between different social and temporal domains, they may serve 
as diplomatic devices that facilitate communication between different discourses and may 
function as tools of translation across the boundaries that separate different groups or 
communities (Hellsten 2002).  
However, we do not agree with Pitt's statement that the way to find the right 
metaphor is by applying what he calls the pragmatist's first maxim: "consider the 
consequences." We believe that the test should rather be what we consider to be the first 
maxim: "facilitate cooperation and cohabitation."  
In further elaborating this facilitating role of metaphor we can benefit from the 
work of pragmatist Donald Schön. According to him the difficulties in handling intractable 
social and moral controversies have more to do with problem setting than with problem 
solving, "more to do with ways in which we frame the purposes to be achieved than with 
the selection of optimal means for achieving them" (Schön 1979, p. 255).  
According to Schön, problem settings are mediated by the stories in which people 
tell what is wrong and what needs fixing in a troublesome situation. When we examine 
these problem-setting stories, it becomes apparent that the framing of problems often 
depends upon metaphors underlying the stories which generate problem setting and set the 
directions of problem solving. Metaphors enable us—generally automatically and 
unconsciously—to make a "normative leap" from data to recommendations, from fact to 
values, from "is" to "ought." Schön gives the example of a slum that could be framed as a 
disease (that must be cured) or as a natural community (which must be protected or 
restored). Once we can see the problematic situation in terms of a normative dualism such 
as health/disease or nature/artifice, we shall know in what direction to move. It is the 
metaphor articulating the frame that carries over the logic from "is" to "ought."  
As a pragmatist, Schön is interested in the creative and constructive resolution of 
policy controversies, generated by different and conflicting metaphors. Such controversies 
seem intractable; they are often not resolvable by recourse to facts and unlikely to be 
settled by compromise. They require what Schön calls "frame restructuring." Hereby "we 
respond to frame conflict by constructing a new problem-setting story, one in which we 
attempt to integrate conflicting frames by including features and relations drawn from 
earlier stories" (p. 270).  
A necessary condition for frame restructuring, i.e. the recasting and reconnecting of 
things and relations in the perceptual and social field, is frame reflection. This requires 
what Schön and Rein have called "double vision": "the ability to act from a frame while 
cultivating awareness of alternative frames" (Schön & Rein 1994, p. 207).  
This notion of double vision expresses exactly the kind of attitude that is required 
for the pragmatist ideal of equal coexistence. As we noted in our volume: "The conflicting 
parties have to appreciate the fact that they are competing for primacy within the same 
universe of discourse with others who cannot beforehand be branded as unreasonable. 
Such reflexive awareness rejects the naivety of dogmatic beliefs, recognizes its own 
fallibility and leaves room for 'reasonable dissensus'" (Keulartz et al. 2002, p. 262).  
 
Moral Agency?  
Both Radder and Pitt have commented on the editors' claim that technological 
artifacts possess a written-in or built-in normativity. While Radder beliefs this claim to be 
misleading, when it does not take into account the context, Pitt beliefs it to be utterly 
wrong. Pitt's remarks on ethical colonialism—"the attempt to endow everything in the 
world as an actor with moral value"—are certainly astute. They provide a sharp warning 
against trendy but sloppy philosophizing. And we could not agree more with him that 
things are not moral actors like humans are, and do not possess moral value like humans 
and other sentient animals possess. Nowhere in the book do we suggest that things have 
moral value because they are moral actors. Moreover, as we will show further on, we 
share his opinion that not everything is or should be moral; there are other important 
values as well. However, we do belief that it is useful to speak of artifacts as (possible) 
moral agents. Not for ontological reasons, but for pragmatist ones.  
Different ways of describing the relations between humans, technological artifacts 
and ethics highlight different elements of technological culture, and obscure others. Pitt 
squarely "places normativity in people." Normativity rests exclusively on human values 
and the choices we base thereupon. In his vision, there is no room for any agency of 
things. Pitt's concern seems to be that by ascribing normativity to artifacts we conflate 
categories. This in turn can easily lead to downgrading humans to the level of things, or 
upgrading things to the level of humans. The former is humiliating and dangerous—as has 
been made abundantly clear by the atrocities of the previous century. The latter is merely 
silly, like when the ancient Persian king Darius had the sea flogged because it had 
devoured his war fleet.  
We share Pitt's implicit (and Kant's explicit) concern that one should not treat 
humans as things. But we do not think that it is by definition silly to describe the influence 
of things in terms usually preserved for human agents. Indeed, we think this a prerequisite 
for developing a vision in which normativity is co-created by humans and non-humans. Or 
to phrase this differently: in which normativity is a characteristic of the network, not of 
choosing individuals. A vision, we believe, that is even implied in Pitt's own comments.  
We presented the birth control pill as an example of an artifact as moral actor. Pitt 
points out that a) the pill was developed with traditional Catholic values in mind1 and b) 
that it had completely different consequences. For him this proves that artifacts do not 
possess a normativity of their own. For us it does prove exactly that. The gap between 
designer intentions and realized consequences provides a strong argument to talk of 
artifacts as possessing an agency of their own. We can even bow here to Pitt's first maxim 
of pragmatism ("consider the consequences"), which he himself seems to forget when he 
equates the normativity of the pill—if any—with the intentions of its designer. For Pitt 
these intentions were thwarted by the conflicting intentions of the users—the women in 
this case. We, on the other hand, feel that it is reasonable to say that these user-intentions 
in their turn were partly shaped by the artifact itself. Once the pill existed, it created new 
possibilities that changed women's (and in the end, men's) expectations of life, 
relationships, parenthood, work, and so forth. Pitt himself acknowledges that artifacts can 
influence our values and choices when he speaks of technological change as threatening 
our conceptions of the good life, our most fundamental values. Now, how to threaten 
without being an actor in a certain sense?  
Co-evolution  
Technological artifacts possess a robustness, inertia and/or "uncontrollability" that 
makes that they do not quietly conform to the choices of their designers or users. They can 
even shape these choices. After a while it becomes impossible to determine who or what 
shaped what or whom first. Our human fates, including our morals, have become deeply 
entwined with the fates of non-humans. Sometimes we draw a sharp line between the two. 
After all, there is quite a relevant difference between hitting a nail or a neighbor. At other 
times softening the distinction opens our eyes for the intricacies of living in a 
technological culture where technology and culture co-evolve. Technological development 
is in part the result of technological, epistemic values, partly of cultural—including 
moral—values. And the same has become true of moral development. Humans do not 
choose or value in a technological vacuum. In our technological culture morality is co-
produced by humans and non-humans.  
A possible task for pragmatist ethics is studying this co-production, in the hope of 
enlarging our ability to "manage" it. There are many different modalities of co-production. 
In the most clear-cut case, artifacts can force us to (not) perform certain actions, leaving us 
little or no choice. The speed bump in the road forces me to drive at a safe speed. We have 
delegated part of our morals to artifacts. But the same bump hinders the ambulance on its 
way to an injured child. In this unintended consequence the "robustness" of the artifact, its 
own agency, becomes manifest. It is interesting to note that in the case of "forced actions" 
artifacts operate directly, with little or no symbolic mediation. My car can be more or less 
environment-friendly without me knowing anything about it. The result is a decrease of 
moral deliberation: driving safely becomes a matter of routine or necessity, independent of 
any explicit moral intentions or choices on the side of the driver (Achterhuis 1995, pp. 
204-222).  
Artifacts forcing us to do the right thing are relatively rare. More often they provide 
us with new possibilities—usually closing off a few existing ones in the process. These 
possibilities do not simply enlarge our freedom, they also kiss to life dormant obligations 
and responsibilities by supplying the "cans" to "oughts" we had scarcely realized existed. 
In this sense, it can be argued—opposite to what we said above—that technology 
increases the room and need for moral deliberation. An example would be the way in 
which the technical possibility for organ transplantation has created a whole new 
responsibility, and according to some even a moral duty, to donate ones organs.  
Furthermore, artifacts open up new worlds by changing or enlarging the ways we 
perceive ourselves, our fellow humans and the objects around us (Verbeek 2000). Think 
about the telescope that made us realize how infinitely small we are, or about the 
television that sometime creates solidarity between humans who never met each other in 
person, or the cars and trains that completely changed our relationship to the 
environment—now speeding by. Sometimes these technologically induced changes in 
perception have relevant moral consequences and sometimes they do not.  
Are we now falling into the trap of ethical colonialism, attributing moral agency to 
all artifacts? We believe not. We already saw that technology can lead as easily to more 
morality as to less. But there is a more pragmatist reason. Often the influence of artifacts is 
trivial, e.g. when Joseph Pitt has to change course because a tree is in his way. Sometimes 
it isn't, e.g. when a fence directs him to a gate where officials are waiting to photograph 
him and take his fingerprints. In the first case it makes no sense to talk about the moral 
agency of things, in the second case it does. Not because the tree and the fence act 
differently, but because they interact differently with our values. It all depends on the 
context—in this respect we fully agree with Radder. In the end it is us who decide when a 
thing makes relevant changes in our behavior or values. We decide when artifacts are 
moral actors.  
We thank our commentators for giving us an incentive to further develop our 
thoughts on the relevance of pragmatist ethics for a technological culture. We realize that 
we failed to supply convincing answers to all the questions they raised, but we hope we 
have at least clarified a few points. We understand our proposal for a pragmatist ethics as a 
research program (Schermer & Keulartz 2003), which we expect will have the heuristic 
power to generate the new ideas and fresh insights that are needed to accommodate our 
moral convictions and technological inventions.  
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1 As a historical anecdote we can add that in the Netherlands the pill was originally 
manufactured in the Catholic south and was packed by nuns.  
 
